

(CATAGNI continued).

Containers to CATAGNI  
combined with 2 S.I.S. men  
at a different point. A/U  
lost after delivery - 26.3.43.

A. LACROIXE.  
Organiser Instructor,  
22.4.43.

Containers to CATAGNI  
combined with 1 S.I.S. man  
at a different point. A/U  
lost after delivery.  
23.6.43.

(BARRON continued.)

A. CHUMBER A.  
Organiser Instructor.

A. CHUMBER B.  
W/Op. 27.10.42.

A. MOORE.  
Special Liaison Officer  
to replace PASSELY.

THOMAS.  
W/Op. to BERRY.  
18.2.43.

A. KOHLRAKE.  
-----  
Organiser Instructor.

A. SEAYALE.  
-----  
Organiser Instructor.

A. SEBOUT.  
-----  
Organiser Instructor.  
9.3.43.

A. GERACH.  
-----  
Organiser Instructor

A. RETHALL.  
-----  
W/Op. 22.4.43.

A. POLO.  
-----  
Organiser Instructor

A. BERQUET.  
-----  
Organiser Instructor

A. SAVASH.  
-----  
Organiser Instructor  
22.5.43.

Legend.


A. = Phase A. Agent.

S. = Sabotage Agent.

----- Agents identified by CHIVE as being in captivity.

- - - - - Agents who exist, on the assumption that CHIVE and BERRY are correct, also be in captivity.

APPENDIX 1. - Diagram of Doppo



Dropping Operations.

S. PARKIEP  
Sabotage Organiser  
S. Holland.

S. SPINAKI  
w/cp. to PARKIEP & POTATO.  
22.6.42.

A. BROODMAN  
Organiser of Escape Route -  
Pigeon Service - Safe Houses

S. OTTE  
w/cp. to BROODMAN.  
18.2.43.

S. TURNIP } Blind,  
Sabotage Organiser } 28.3.42.  
w/cp. SWANES (Y)

1 man killed on landing.

A. BROODMAN  
w/cp. to SALE.

A. BUSTARD  
Organiser Instructor.  
28.11.42.

S. STUYVE  
Sabotage Leader to S. Brabant (?)  
and Lieburg.  
16.2.43.

S. LECK } Blind 5.4.42.  
Sabotage Leader in in Overijssel }  
w/cp. HECK.

40 man was dropped to LECK, but he had 11 Container  
operations of which 5 were successful: 3 A/c lost.  
LECK received by STUYVE, was sent to LECK (?)  
also LECK A. received by LECK.

S. GAUNT } Blind 27.2.42.  
Sabotage Organiser in Rotterdam. }  
No receptions: returned to U.K. on 2.9.43 }  
having accomplished nothing.

GLASSHOUSE } Blind 7.9.41.  
No reception - returned U.K. 17.2.42.

S. POTATO.

Sea route 19.4.42.  
Organiser of Dutch end of ferry service U.K./Holland.

No receptions.

STATISTICS

HOLLAND

Number of Interrogation Reports analyzed. 48

Number of other reports analyzed 23

In addition, all relevant information  
has been extracted from Group 'H' Reports.



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## EVALUATION

### CP

#### S.O.S. OPERATIONS IN HOLLAND.

#### SUMMARY.

S.O.S. operations in HOLLAND were subject to the following important factors:-

- (i) Lack of co-operation from the Dutch authorities, especially during 1942-1943, which had a very adverse effect on operations and above all on recruiting.
- (ii) The small size and dense population of HOLLAND, which makes the selection of dropping grounds very difficult and pick-up operations virtually impossible.
- (iii) The geographical situation of HOLLAND rendered it a difficult and dangerous area from the operational point of view.
- (iv) Lack of co-ordination between S.O.S. and S.I.S. during 1941-1943, which had an adverse effect on S.O.S. activities.

As a result of these factors S.O.S. operations in HOLLAND were very difficult. These difficulties were unfortunately aggravated by the fact that the first W/T operator despatched to the field was arrested by the enemy and played back. In spite of this agent's efforts to warn the Home Station, the Country Section continued to have confidence in him and as a result dropped about 40 agents and some stores to enemy controlled reception committees during the period 1941-1943. As a result, there was in 1943, no British contact with Dutch resistance and from the beginning of 1944 to the end of the war a new organisation had to be built up and operated with great haste and under difficult conditions.

In spite of these handicaps an efficient organisation was built up and carried out successful attacks against road, rail and water communications, as well as industrial installations. In addition, the organisation was responsible for useful counter-air raiding activities, particularly in port areas.

Although the results obtained were not as great nor as widespread as those in some other countries they were nevertheless significant and, considering the circumstances under which they were achieved, the Dutch Section who were working from 1944 onwards should receive full credit for them.

CONTAINER OPERATIONS

<u>Period</u>	<u>Containers</u>	<u>Passengers</u>
1943	-	2
1942	842	21
1941	840	13
1944	2,759	326
1945	2,034	365
	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>
TOTAL	5,397	777
	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>

NOTE: Almost all 1941-45 deliveries were dropped to agency controlled reception committees.

AGENTS AND CANDIDATES

<u>Period</u>	<u>Agents Sent to Field</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Disputed</u>	<u>Note</u>
1941-43	25	34	32	2	
1944-45	30	13	4	47	Excluding Technicians
	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	
TOTAL	141	49	37	78	
	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	

NOTE: Nearly all agents dropped in the period 1941-45 were dropped to controlled reception.



PLANNING.

During the period 1941-1943 all plans were directed to establishing contact and building up an organization. Unfortunately the plans adopted depended on too great centralization in the field and early penetration by the enemy resulted in the destruction of the whole organization.

From 1944 to the end of the war, the planning of the Dutch Section appears to have been sound and methodical. This is confirmed by the results obtained in a short time and working with haste under difficult circumstances.

RECRUITING.

E.O.E. briefed agents on their missions and the Dutch authorities briefed them on general conditions.

Seven agents stated that they were satisfied with their briefing and seven were dissatisfied, but of these seven two were handled by Airborne Forces.

The Country Section comments that up to early 1944 very little detailed information was available on conditions of work in HOLLAND and that for that reason briefing was not as good as it became later. This is true, and it was one of the prices paid for the early disasters in this country.

FALSE PAPERS.

The Country Section provided false papers which were to serve until new papers could be secured in HOLLAND. Agents were informed that the papers issued were not perfect and should be changed as soon as possible. Most agents understood the necessity for this system and there were no major complaints about papers.

D-DAY PLANS.

- (a) Agents were almost unanimous in saying that the D-day plans issued were clear and satisfactory. The only complaints came from two regions which were not in direct touch with LONDON.
- (b) It would seem probable that it would be disastrous to call out resistance under the circumstances which existed more than 48 hours before the arrival of Allied troops.



TRAINING.

1. W/T.

Agents generally considered the W/T training which they received to be satisfactory. Several of them felt that more time could have been spent on learning maintenance.

2. General.

Most agents stated that they were very satisfied with the training which they received. Group 'B' training was felt to be the most useful.

The only adverse comments received were:-

- (a) Several men reported that the Group 'B' course overstressed the need for security measures. (The history of the Section scarcely supports this contention).
- (b) Several stated they could have had training in driving motor cars and motor cycles.
- (c) A number felt that training in S-phones and Eureka was a waste of time as these devices were seldom used in HOLLAND.
- (d) One or two expressed the need for further military training if they were to engage in guerrilla warfare.

DESPATCH.

Agents were satisfied with the arrangements for despatch as a whole.

The arrangements for searching seem to have been unsatisfactory. A number of agents report that they were not searched before departure. It may be that this was in part due to the fact that they were despatched from various aerodromes and that the system was not always the same. Nevertheless, some system should be devised by which searching is never omitted. This is essential, not only for the security of the agent, but also for national security.

A number of complaints were made that leg tags gave trouble. This was partly due to inexperience on the part of despatchers in affixing leg tags and adjusting them, but there is no doubt that the leg tag needs improvement.

Arrival /

#### ARRIVAL.

There are many complaints of bad despatch from aircraft. Despatchers were reported to be inefficient and sometimes indifferent. There were also many complaints of drops being either too high or too low.

The Country Section state that this was because Dutch operations were done by 39 Group who did not have the technique used by 2225PMD. Nevertheless this failure on the part of 39 Group to despatch efficiently was a serious one and in future every effort must be made to prevent such incidents which are bound to affect the agents' morale.

In two instances agents were dropped to the wrong committee. It seems that some system should be instituted by which such an accident cannot take place.

#### AIRBORNE OPERATIONS.

Although two agents escaped by sea and various small boat operations were mounted across rivers there are no points of general interest to record under this head.

#### SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

- (a) From the technical point of view W/T communication with HOLLAND proved reliable and no special difficulties were experienced.
- (b) One W/T operator used a remote control system by which he could operate any one of five stations from a central control. He used assistants to tune the individual stations and could switch from one to another if enemy W/T activity made it desirable.
- (c) In the early stages of S.O.S. work in HOLLAND one W/T operator was arrested by the enemy and played back successfully for a long time. Other operators, who were arrested as a result of this original capture, were also played back. This serious sequence of events shows how necessary it is to produce a good system of safe checks and also how important it is for any suspicious messages received to be subjected to critical scrutiny by high authority.
- (d) One report emphasises the importance of broadcasts being issued before curfew to facilitate the work of couriers and messengers.































- (iv) The three blockade ships the "SCHROEDER", "WESTPHAL" and "KROENKE" were sent to ROTTERDAM.

October:

- (v) On 4 Oct it was reported that since 10 Sep thirty rail tracks had been cut and five major roads put out of action.
- (vi) The railway between AMSTERDAM and APPELDOORN was cut, derailling a train and causing two days' delay on the line. A railway bridge two miles south of AMSTERDAM was blown up by the Resistance on 13/14 Oct. The line between AMSTERDAM and ROTTERDAM was cut in four places on the night 20/21 Oct 44.
- (vii) The railway bridge between HILVERSUM and DEFT was sabotaged.
- (viii) The lift bridge at WIERD RIJ DORDRECHT was attacked, damage being caused to the lifting machinery.

November:

- (ix) Train derailed at ROTTERDAM - HETP.
- (x) German troop train derailed at ROTTERDAM and WILLEM - several Germans killed and wounded.
- (xi) Both tracks on the ROTTERDAM - HILVERSUM line blown up.
- (xii) Several wagons on the ROTTERDAM - HILVERSUM line derailed.
- (xiii) Railway line ROTTERDAM - ROTTERDAM sabotaged.
- (xiv) Railway line ROTTERDAM - ROTTERDAM sabotaged.
- (xv) Derailling of one locomotive and 20 wagons at ROTTERDAM.
- (xvi) Raid on the Wehrmacht bank at ROTTERDAM - 45,000,000 guilders seized.

January:

- (xvii) In Jan 45 a successful attack was reported on the ATLANTA building, ROTTERDAM, which contained registers of personnel due for labour service in GERMANY. Similar attacks were carried out on another building on 3 Jan. Another registration building in the ROTTERDAM area, ROTTERDAM, was also destroyed on 7 Jan and various registers of the population brought to a place of safety.

February:

- (xviii) Transformers supplying current to German Naval Establishments and important factories working for the German War Industry had been sabotaged.
- (xix) ROTTERDAM reported the sinking of a newly launched 3,000 ton vessel.

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- (ix) UTRECHT reported the sinking of four barges loaded with 180,000 litres of oil.
- (xii) 5 I.E. charges were placed in the S.D. office at the Singel, DORDRECHT - 16 S.D. personnel being killed.

March:

- (xiii) UTRECHT reported the cutting of all railways from AMERSFOORT to the EAST to impede the transport of political prisoners to GERMANY.

HISTORY

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Anglo Dutch Country Club

THIS APPENDIX IS FILED WITH THE DUTCH  
Section Histories as no ANGLO-DUTCH Section  
History has been found.



INTELLIGENCE APPENDIX TO  
A.D.C.S. SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The first successful operation launched by A.D.C.S. was introduced into SUMATRA at the end of June 1945, whereas JAVA did not come under the Group 'B' area of operations until after the Japanese surrender. As a result, the vast majority of intelligence received from the S.I.I. referred to the post-surrender period, relating principally to the activities and political attitudes of the Indonesians rather than to the Japanese. Furthermore, a proportion of the parties introduced after the surrender were primarily concerned with R.A.P.F.I. work and consequently produced little or no intelligence. This was notably true of JAVA where only one operation (KORUNTO) produced any intelligence at all. In spite of this, intelligence was received from almost out of a total of fifteen parties introduced, representing a very high percentage of all intelligence from the S.I.I. received by army formations from the clandestine services.

During the period of concentration of 26 Indian Divisions in INDIA, daily intelligence summaries containing all information from field stations were passed to Force 136 Liaison Officer with Divisional Headquarters. This procedure was continued after the Division landed in SUMATRA, and the same procedure was subsequently applied to Force 136 Liaison Officer with H.Q. A.P.S.S.I. in Batavia.

With the increase of political unrest, however, and the consequent change of policy in regard to S.I.I. parties, the volume of intelligence decreased rapidly and, at the time of writing, these parties have been withdrawn and preparations are in hand for the introduction of S.I.I. parties under army and not Force 136 control. A short description follows of the intelligence activities of each party in order of introduction, parties which produced no intelligence at all being excluded.

S I I A T R O P

1. TERUNTO

This operation was parachuted into the KOTA-KOTA area at the end of June 1945, and later operated in the KOTA-KOTA area, producing intelligence of considerable value particularly with regard to communications. The value of TERUNTO's information in this respect was recognised by an operative signal directed at this H.Q. from A.P.S.S.I.

Analysis of all types of intelligence received from this operation:

Communications	21
Harbour Installations	4
Troop Dispositions	12
Troop Movements	11
Political	25
General	8